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Abstract
Typical welfare and inequality measures are required to be Lorenz consistent which guarantees that
inequality decreases and welfare increases as a result of a progressive transfer. We explore the im-
plications for welfare and inequality measurement of substituting the weaker absolute di®erentials,
deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings for the Lorenz quasi-ordering. Restricting attention
to distributions of equal means, we show that the utilitarian model { the so-called expected utility
model in the theory of risk { does not permit one to make a distinction between the views embedded
in the di®erentials, deprivation, satisfaction and Lorenz quasi-orderings. In contrast it is possible
within the dual model of M. Yaari (Econometrica 55 (1987), 99{115) to derive the restrictions to
be placed on the weighting function which guarantee that the corresponding welfare orderings are
consistent with the di®erentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings, respectively. Finally
we drop the equal mean condition and indicate the implications of our approach for the absolute
ethical inequality indices.
Journal of Economic Literature Classi¯cation Number: D31, D63. Keywords: Income Di®erentials,
Deprivation, Satisfaction, Lorenz Dominance, Progressive Transfers, Expected Utility, Generalized
Gini social welfare functions.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and Relationship to the Literature
Following Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969) there is a wide agreement in the literature to
appeal to the Lorenz curve for measuring inequality. A distribution of income is typically
considered as being no more unequal than another distribution if its Lorenz curve lies nowhere
below that of the latter distribution. Besides its simple graphical representation, much of the
popularity of the so-called Lorenz criterion originates in its relationship with the notion of
progressive transfers. It is traditionally assumed that inequality is reduced by a progressive
transfer i.e., when income is transferred from a richer to a poorer individual whithout a®ecting
their relative positions on the ordinal income scale. The principle of tranfers, which captures
this judgement, is closely associated with the Lorenz quasi-ordering of distributions of equal
means. Indeed half a century ago, Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952) have demonstrated
that, if a distribution Lorenz dominates another distribution, then the former can be obtained
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from the latter by means of a ¯nite sequence of progressive transfers, and conversely1. This
relationship between progressive transfers and the Lorenz quasi-ordering constitutes the cor-
nerstone of the modern theory of welfare and inequality measurement. As a consequence, the
literature has concentrated on Lorenz consistent inequality measures i.e., indices such that a
progressive transfer is always recorded as reducing inequality or increasing welfare.
Notwithstanding its wide application in theoretical and empirical work the approach based
on the Lorenz curve is not immune to criticism. Whereas most of the literature on inequality
and welfare measurement imposes the principle of transfers, one may however raise doubts
about the ability of such a condition to capture the very idea of inequality in general. Though
a progressive transfer unambiguously reduces inequality between the individuals involved in
the transfer, it is far from being obvious that everyone would agree that inequality on the
whole has declined as a result. This is due to the fact that in general making two incomes
closer increases the gap between each of these two incomes and the incomes of the rest of the
society, so that it is di±cult to admit that inequality on the whole has declined. It is to some
extent surprising that the profession has been assimilating overall inequality reduction with
local pairwise inequality reduction for such a long time. The fact that progressive transfers are
not universally approved has been con¯rmed by recent experimental studies [see e.g. Amiel
and Cowell (1992), Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993), Harrison and Seidl (1994), Gaertner
and Namezie (2003) among others].
However the experimental studies fail to provide information about the subjects' prefer-
ences towards equality with the exception that these preferences are at variance with the
views captured by the principle of tranfers used by the theory of inequality measurement.
Di®erent ideas come to mind in order to reconcile the theory with the conclusions of these
experimental studies. A ¯rst possibility would be to declare that inequality unambiguously
decreases if and only if the income di®erentials between any two individuals in the popu-
lation are reduced, assuming that all individuals occupy the same positions on the income
scale in the situations under comparison. This is a kind of unanimity point of view: overall
inequality decreases if and only if the inequalities between any two individuals in the society
decrease. This rules out the limitation of the principle of transfers we pointed out above since
now, not only should the gap between the donor and the recipient of a transfer be reduced,
but also the gaps between these two individuals and the individuals not taking part in the
transfer. This still leaves open the question to know which kind of income di®erentials are
thought of relevance when making inequality judgements. The relative and absolute di®er-
entials quasi-orderings introduced by Marshall, Olkin and Proschan (1967) constitute two
possible candidates. But there are other possible views { e.g. along the lines suggested by
Bossert and P¯ngsten (1990) { that might constitute alternative grounds for constructing a
theory of inequality measurement more in line with common sense.
1Although parts of this general result appeared in di®erent places in Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952),
one had to wait until Berge (1963) who collected these scattered statements and provided a self-contained
proof of what is know now as the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem. Related results in the ¯eld of inequality
measurement have been provided by Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970), and Fields and Fei (1978) among others
[see also Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973), Sen (1973), and Foster (1985)].
2Measuring Inequality Without the Pigou-Dalton Condition
On the other hand, there is evidence that the social status of an individual { approxi-
mated by her position in the social hierarchy { plays an important role in the determination
of her well-being [see e.g. Weiss and Fershtman (1998)]. Attitudes such as envy, depriva-
tion, resentment and satisfaction have been argued to be important components of individual
judgements and they might be taken into account as far as distributive justice is concerned.
In particular the notion of individual deprivation originating in the work of Runciman (1966)
accommodates such views making the individual's assessment of a given social state depend
on her situation compared with the situations of all the individuals who are treated more
favourably than her. The deprivation pro¯le, which indicates the level of deprivation felt by
each individual, might therefore constitute the basis of social judgement. Drawing upon pre-
vious work by Yitzhaki (1979, 1982), Hey and Lambert (1980), Kakwani (1984), Chakravarty
(1997), and Chakravarty and Moyes (2003), one can propose two deprivation quasi-orderings
depending on the way individual deprivation is de¯ned. Individual deprivation in a given
state formally ressembles the aggregate poverty gap where the poverty line is set equal to
other individuals' incomes2. So stated, one may conceive of absolute individual deprivation,
which is simply the sum of the gaps between the individual's income and the incomes of all
individuals richer than her, and relative deprivation, where the income gaps are de°ated by
the individual's income. Then the deprivation quasi-ordering is based on the comparisons
of the individual deprivation curves and social deprivation unambiguously decreases as the
individual deprivation curve is moving downwards.
Rather than comparing herself with individuals who are richer than her { equivalently
who occupy a higher position on the social status scale { an individual can consider those
who are poorer. The larger the aggregate gap between her income and the incomes of poorer
individuals, the higher her satisfaction will be. More precisely one may conceive of absolute
individual satisfaction, which is simply the sum of the gaps between the individual's income
and the incomes of all individuals poorer than her, and relative individual satisfaction, where
the income gaps are de°ated by the individual's income [see Chakravarty (1997)]. The notion
of satisfaction may be considered the dual of the notion of deprivation. Then the satisfaction
quasi-ordering is based on the comparisons of the individual satisfaction curves and social
satisfaction unambiguously decreases as the individual satisfaction curve moves downwards.
A natural objective of the society will be to make individual satisfaction and deprivation as
small as possible, the minimum being attained when all incomes are equal.
1.2. The Theoretical Approach Developed in the Paper
Assuming that we subscribe to these more primitive notions of inequality, the next step is
to identify the welfare and inequality indices that are consistent with the di®erentials, de-
privation and/or satisfaction quasi-orderings. In this paper we restrict attention to ethical
2Most scholars take for granted that individual deprivation is simply the sum { possibly normalized in a
suitable way { of the income gaps between the individual's income and the incomes of all individuals richer
than her. An axiomatic characterization of the absolute deprivation pro¯le is provided by Ebert and Moyes
(2000).
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inequality indices, which means that we start with a given welfare ordering of income dis-
tributions { more precisely a given social welfare function { and derive an inequality index
in an appropriate way3. We assume in addition that this ordering can be represented by a
member of the class of rank-dependent expected utility social welfare functions introduced
by Quiggin (1993), which admits as particular cases the utilitarian and the generalized Gini
social welfare functions known as the expected utility and the Yaari models respectively in
the theory of choice under risk4. Then we look for the restrictions that have to be imposed
on the social welfare function { equivalently on the social welfare ordering { that guarantee
that the implied ethical inequality index is consistent with the primitive views captured by
the di®erentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings. It is argued that the standard
expected utility model does not permit to distinguish the di®erent concepts of inequality dis-
cussed above. In other words, the utilitarian social welfare function is not su±ciently °exible
to accommodate such distinct attitudes as those encompassed by the di®erentials, depriva-
tion and satisfaction quasi-orderings. On the contrary the dual model of choice introduced
by Yaari (1987, 1988) permits to derive measures which are consistent with the di®erentials,
deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings5. More precisely, the paper identi¯es the restric-
tions to be imposed on the weighting function that guarantee that inequality will not increase
when incomes are more equally distributed according to the three former quasi-orderings.
1.3. Organization of the Paper
Section 2 introduces our conceptual framework consisting of distributions for ¯nite popula-
tions of possibly di®erent sizes where every individual is associated with a given income. In
addition to the Lorenz criterion, we distinguish di®erent inequality views which we identify
with quasi-orderings de¯ned on the set of income distributions. The quasi-orderings we con-
sider are all weaker than the Lorenz quasi-ordering as they all imply it. Section 3 de¯nes the
inequality quasi-orderings used in the paper, explores their relationships and hints at some
connections with progressive transfers. We examine in Section 4 di®erent ways of weakening
the notion of equalizing transfer { equivalently of strenghening the principle of transfers {
which are related to our inequality quasi-orderings. Section 5 contains our main results and
investigates the implications for the social welfare functions of the inequality views captured
by the di®erentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings in the particular case where
distributions have equal means. It is shown that the utilitarian model, which frames most
of the theory of welfare and inequality measurement, does not allow to distinguish between
these views and the traditional one captured by the Lorenz quasi-ordering. On the contrary
the model proposed by Yaari (1987, 1988) allows the ethical planner to make a distinction
3See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (1999) for a recent survey of the literature on the ethical approach
to inequality measurement.
4The rank-dependent expected utility model is °exible enough to accommodate most of the inequality views
one encounters in the literature.
5Yaari's (1987) model was introduced in the ¯elds of choice under risk and then applied to the measurement
of inequality in Yaari (1988). Related approaches have been proposed in the inequality literature by Ebert
(1988) and Weymark (1981).
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between these competing views. Section 6 indicates how the analysis could be extended in
order to cover the general case where the distributions under comparison do not necessar-
ily have the same mean. We summarize our results in Section 7 which also hints at some
directions for future work.
2. Preliminary Notation and Definitions
We assume throughout that incomes are drawn from an interval D which is a compact subset
of R. An income distribution or situation for a population consisting of n identical individuals
(n ¸ 2) is a list x := (x1;x2;:::;xn) where xi 2 D is the income of individual i. We
indicate by 1n := (1;:::;1) the unit vector in R
n. Letting Yn(D) represent the set of income
distributions for a population of size n, the set of all income distributions of ¯nite size will be
denoted as Y(D) :=
S1
n=2 Yn(D). The dimension of distribution x 2 Y(D) is indicated by
n(x) and its arithmetic mean by ¹(x) :=
Pn(x)









to indicate its non-decreasing rearrangement de¯ned by
x( ) = Px for some n(x)£n(x) permutation matrix P such that x(1) · x(2) · ¢¢¢ · x(n(x))
6.
We denote as F(¢;x) the cumulative distribution function of x 2 Y(D) de¯ned by F(z;x) :







We let F¡1(¢;x) represent the inverse cumulative distribution function { equivalently the
quantile function { of x obtained by letting F¡1(0;x) := x(1) and
(2.1) F¡1(p;x) := Inf
©
z 2 (¡1;+1)
¯ ¯F(z;x) ¸ p
ª
; 8p 2 (0;1]
[see Gastwirth (1971)].
We are interested in the comparisons of income distributions from the point of view of
social welfare and inequality. A social welfare function W : Y(D) ¡! R associates to every
distribution a real number W(x) that represents the social welfare attained in situation
x 2 Y(D). When W(x) ¸ W(y), then we will say that situation x is at least as good as
y from the point of view of W. Similarly an inequality index I : Y(D) ¡! R indicates for
every distribution the degree of inequality attained with the convention that I(x) · I(y)
means that situation x is no more unequal than situation y. Here social welfare functions
and inequality indices are considered as particular cardinal representations of orderings {
complete, re°exive and transitive binary relations { on the set of income distributions, and no
cardinal signi¯cance should be attributed to the values taken by these indices. We denote as
W(D) and I(D) the set of social welfare functions and the set of inequality indices respectively.
Although our primary concern is to make comparisons of arbitrary distributions whose
dimensions may di®er, it is worth emphasizing that there is no loss of generality restricting
attention to distributions with the same dimension. This is a consequence of the principle
of population according to which a replication does not a®ect inequality and welfare [see
6A permutation matrix P := [pij] is an n £ n (some n ¸ 2) matrix such that (i) for all i;j, either pij = 0,
or pij = 1, (ii) for all i, pij = 1 implies pik = 0, for all k 6= j, and (iii) for all j, pij = 1 implies phj = 0, for
all h 6= i.
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Dalton (1920)]7. Similarly because all individuals are identical in all respects other than
their incomes, one usually imposes the condition of symmetry which requires that exchanging
incomes between two individuals would not a®ect the levels of welfare and inequality8.
In a number of cases it is impossible to reach a unanimous agreement regarding the
appropriate ordering of situations and the only consensus that one might reasonably expect
only yields a partial ranking. A quasi-ordering is a re°exive and transitive binary relation
de¯ned on the set of distributions which may result in a partial ranking of the situations
under consideration9. Given the quasi-ordering ¸J over Y(D), we denote as >J and »J its
asymmetrical and symmetrical components de¯ned in the usual way. We are mostly concerned
with welfare and inequality indices that are compatible with certain given inequality views
that will be expressed by means of quasi-orderings. Precisely, given a quasi-ordering ¸J over
Y(D) and a social welfare function W 2 W(D) [resp. an inequality index I 2 I(D)], we will
say that W [resp. I] is consistent with ¸J, if
(2.2) 8 x;y 2 Y(D) : x ¸J y =) W(x) ¸ W(y) [resp. I(x) · I(y)]:
All the quasi-orderings ¸J we consider in the paper have the property that (i) xr »J x, for
all x 2 Y(D) and all r 2 N (r ¸ 2), and (ii) Px »J x, for all x 2 Y(D) and all n(x) £ n(x)
permutation matrices P. Therefore there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to
distributions of the same dimension n (n ¸ 2) that are non-decreasingly arranged.
3. From Lorenz to More Primitive Inequality Views
3.1. Introductory Example and De¯nitions
It is typically assumed in normative economics that inequality is reduced and welfare increased
by a transfer of income from a richer individual to a poorer individual. More precisely, we
have:
Definition 3.1. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a progressive transfer, if there exists ¢ > 0 and two individuals i;j such
that
xk = yk; 8 k 6= i;j; (3.1.a)
xi = yi + ¢; xj = yj ¡ ¢; and (3.1.b)
¢ · (yj ¡ yi)/2: (3.1.c)
7Given two distributions x;y 2 Y(D) we will say that x is a replication of y if there exists r 2 N (r ¸ 2)




. Then the index M 2 W(D) [ I(D) satis¯es the principle of
population if, for all x 2 Y(D) and all r 2 N (r ¸ 2): M (xr) = M(x).
8Precisely the index M 2 W(D) [ I(D) satis¯es the condition of symmetry if, for all x 2 Y(D) and all
n(x) £ n(x) permutation matrices P, M (Px) = M(x).
9We adopt throughout the paper the terminology proposed by Sen (1970, Chap. 1*), but we recognize that
there are other possibilities.
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By de¯nition, a progressive transfer does not reverse the relative positions of the individuals
involved. However, although the donor cannot be made poorer than the recipient, it may be
the case that their positions relative to the positions of the other individuals are modi¯ed.
It is convenient to assume that the progressive transfer is rank-preserving in the sense that
the relative positions of all the individuals are una®ected, which amounts to impose the
additional condition:
(3.2) (xk ¡ xh)(yk ¡ yh) ¸ 0; 8 h 6= k:
Principle of Transfers. For all x;y 2 Yn(D), we have W(x) ¸ W(y) and I(x) · I(y),
whenever x is obtained from y by a [rank-preserving] progressive transfer.
The notion of a progressive transfer is closely associated with that of the Lorenz quasi-





F¡1(s;x)ds; 8p 2 [0;1]:
By de¯nition L(p;x) represents the total income possessed by the fraction p of poorest indi-
viduals de°ated by the population size in situation x10.
Definition 3.2. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that x Lorenz
dominates y, which we write x ¸L y, if and only if
(3.4) L(p;x) ¸ L(p;y); 8 p 2 (0;1) and L(1;x) = L(1;y):
The higher its associated Lorenz curve, the less unequal a distribution is according to the







yj; 8k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1; and ¹(x) = ¹(y):
As we already insisted, much of the popularity of the Lorenz criterion originates in the fact
that it is closely associated with progressive transfers. Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952)
were the ¯rst to show that a distribution Lorenz dominates another one if and only if it can
be obtained from the latter by means of successive applications of progressive transfers [see
also Berge (1963), Kolm (1969), Fields and Fei (1978) and Marshall and Olkin (1979) among
others)]. Precisely, they proved the following:
10Our de¯nition of the Lorenz curve is di®erent from the standard one which requires that the total income
possessed by the fraction p of poorest individuals is de°ated by the total income. The di®erence is immaterial
as long as we focus on comparisons of distributions with equal means.
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Proposition 3.1. Let x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y). Then, the following two
statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite sequence of progressive transfers.
(b) x ¸L y.
It is important to note that there is no particular restriction is imposed on the way the
progressive transfers are combined in the result above: any sequence of progressive transfers
results in an improvement in terms of Lorenz dominance. A direct implication of Proposition
3.1 is that any measure that veri¯es the principle of transfers is Lorenz-consistent [see Foster
(1985)].
However despite its wide use in theoretical and empirical work on inequality the Lorenz
quasi-ordering is not the only criterion that can be used in order to rank distributions in an
unambiguous way. Other criteria have been proposed in the literature that pay attention to
di®erent features of the distributions under comparisons and that may be considered potential
candidates for measuring inequality. Particular instances are the deprivation and satisfaction
indices { due to Kakwani (1984) and Chakravarty (1997) respectively { that are concerned
with the feelings of the individuals with respect to their personal situations relative to the
situations of the other individuals. It must also be recognized that in some circumstances the
application of the Lorenz quasi-ordering has implications that go far beyond the judgements
embedded in this criterion. A typical example is given in public ¯nance, where it has been
shown that an a non-decreasing average tax rate is a necessary and su±cient condition for
the after tax distribution to Lorenz dominate the before tax distribution whatever the cir-
cumstances [see Jakobsson (1976)]. Actually the application of the Lorenz criterion implies
that all pairwise relative income di®erences be not larger in the after tax distribution than
in the before tax one [see Moyes (1994)]. A test involving the comparisons of all pairwise
di®erences { leaving aside for the moment the way we measure these di®ererences { appears
to be an uncontroversial criterion for passing inequality judgements.
Therefore the Lorenz criterion does not exhaust all the possibilities for measuring in-
equality and one may think of other potential candidates. Given the relationship between
the Lorenz criterion and progressive transfers, this calls into question the very principle of
transfers that is at the heart of the theory of inequality measurement and that sustain the
Lorenz criterion. This suggests that not everyone would agree on the fact that a progressive
transfer decreases inequality in all circumstances. This has been exempli¯ed in a number of
experimental studies by means of questionnaires where it has been demonstrated that the
principle of transfers is largely rejected by the respondents [see Amiel and Cowell (1992),
Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993), Harrison and Seidl (1994), Gaertner and Namezie (2003)
among others]. The following example, which captures the main features of the situations
presented to the interviewed in these experiments, might help to convince the reader that the
principle of transfers is debatable.
Example 3.1. Let n = 4 and consider the distributions x1 = (1;3;5;7), x2 = (1;3;6;6), x3 =
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(1;4;4;7), x4 = (2;2;5;7), and x5 = (2;3;5;6). It is immediate that each of the distributions
x2, x3, x4 and x5 obtains from x1 by means of a single [rank-preserving] progressive transfer
of one income unit. It follows from Proposition 3.1 that xg ¸L x1, for all g = 2;3;4;5, so that
everyone who subscribes to the principle of transfers { equivalently to the Lorenz criterion {
will consider that distributions x2, x3, x4 and x5 are less unequal than distribution x1.
Inspection of the above distributions reveals that x2 is obtained from x1 by transferring one
unit of income from the richest individual to the second richest, which actually amounts to
equalise the incomes of the two richest individuals. Inequality between individuals 3 and 4
has therefore been eliminated but at the same time the income gap { or income di®erentials {
between individuals 1 and 3 on the one hand, and individuals 2 and 3 on the other hand, has
been widened. Although the Lorenz criterion would say that x2 is unambiguously more equal
than x1, there might be { and there are actually { people who disagree with this conclusion
invoking the fact that the pairwise income di®erentials are not all made smaller as a result
of the progressive transfer.
Suppose we agree with the above view according to which inequality unambiguously de-
creases if and only if the absolute di®erence between any two incomes is reduced. Precisely,
given the income distribution x 2 Yn(D), we de¯ne:
(3.6) AD(p;s;x) := F¡1(s;x) ¡ F¡1(p;x); 8 0 · p < s · 1:
Thus AD(p;s;x) measures the absolute income gap between the richer individual occupying
rank s and the poorer individual ranked p in situation x. It is our contention that nobody
would object to the judgement that inequality does not increase when the absolute income
gaps between any richer and any poorer individuals are made smaller. Actually it is a simple
matter to verify that the following de¯nition captures precisely this idea.
Definition 3.3. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that x dominates
y in absolute di®erentials, which we write x ¸AD y, if and only if
(3.7) AD(p;s;x) · AD(p;s;x); 8 0 · p < s · 1:
According to condition (3.6) the di®erences between any two adjacent individuals' incomes
are no larger in situation x than in situation y. Actually condition (3.7) is equivalent to
(3.8) xk+1 ¡ xk · yk+1 ¡ yk; 8 k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1:
This quasi-ordering, ¯rst introduced by Marshall, Olkin and Proschan (1967) in the ¯elds of
majorization [see also Bickel and Lehmann (1976)], has been considered a suitable inequality
criterion [see e.g. Thon (1987), Preston (1990), and Moyes (1994, 1999)].
Although it is di±cult to object against its consensual nature, the absolute di®erentials
quasi-ordering might be viewed far too strong a criterion and one might want consider criteria
that lay half way between it and the Lorenz quasi-ordering. When comparing two distribu-
tions by means of the absolute di®erentials quasi-ordering, every individual compares her
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situation with that of all the individuals richer than her. It might be that what is important
is not really by how much every poorer individual falls below every richer individual, but
rather by how much on average she is away from the richer individuals. This is reminiscent
of the notion of deprivation introduced by Runciman (1966) according to whom the individ-
ual's assessment of a given social state depends on her situation compared with the situations
of individuals who are treated more favourably than her. The absolute deprivation curve of










AD(p;s;x)ds; 8p 2 [0;1]
[see Kakwani (1984)]. We can interpret ADP(p;x) as a measure of the absolute deprivation
felt by individual with rank p in situation x. By de¯nition, the best-o® individual is never
deprived and thus ADP(1;x) = 0, for all x 2 Y(D). Following Chakravarty (1997), we
introduce:
Definition 3.4. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that there is no
more absolute deprivation in x than in y, which we write x ¸ADP y, if and only if
(3.10) ADP(p;x) · ADP(p;y); 8p 2 [0;1):
Actually condition (3.10) simply states that overall deprivation decreases if the individual
deprivation felt by any member of the society decreases. In the particular case where n(x) =




[xj ¡ xk] ·
n X
j=k+1
[yj ¡ yk]; 8 k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1:
Rather than comparing herself with the individuals richer than her, an individual might
¯nd some comfort in comparing her situation with the situations of the individuals who are
in a position worse than her. The absolute satisfaction curve of distribution x 2 Yn(D) {










AD(p;s;x)ds; 8p 2 [0;1]:
We can interpret ASF(p;x) as a measure of the absolute satisfaction felt by individual ranked
p in situation x. By de¯nition, the worst-o® individual is never satis¯ed and ASF(0;x) = 0,
for all x 2 Y(D). Following Chakravarty (1997), we introduce:
Definition 3.5. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that there is no
more absolute satisfaction in x than in y, which we write x ¸ASF y, if and only if
(3.13) ASF(p;x) · ASF(p;y); 8p 2 (0;1]:
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Actually condition (3.13) simply states that overall satisfaction decreases if the individual
satisfaction felt by any member of the society decreases. In the case of discrete distributions




[xk ¡ xj] ·
k¡1 X
j=1
[yk ¡ yj]; 8 k = 2;3;:::;n:
Applying the preceding quasi-orderings to the comparisons of the distributions introduced
in Example 3.1 gives the following rankings:
Table 3.1. Inequality Rankings of Distributions of Example 3.1.
¸AD
x1 x2 x3 x4
x2 #
x3 # #
x4 # # #
x5 1 # # #
¸ADP
x1 x2 x3 x4
x2 1
x3 # #
x4 # # #
x5 1 # # 1
¸ASF
x1 x2 x3 x4
x2 #
x3 # #
x4 1 # #
x5 1 1 # #
¸L
x1 x2 x3 x4
x2 1
x3 1 #
x4 1 # #
x5 1 1 1 1
The symbol \1" at the intersection of row i and column j means that \xi >J xj", while the
occurence of the symbol \#" indicates that the distributions xi and xj are not comparable.
Table 3.1 makes clear that, depending on the way we measure it, the change in inequality
caused by a progressive transfer may be ambiguous. In particular anyone who subscribes to
the views captured by the di®erentials, the deprivation or the satisfaction quasi-ordering may
feel unable to accept the common view that inequality decreases as a result of a progressive
transfer. This is in accordance with the ¯ndings of the experimental studies we referred to
above which aimed at confronting the axioms laid down by the theorist with the society's
values. A recurrent conclusion of all these studies is that the public rejects to a large extent
the principle of transfers.
3.2. Properties and Relationships Between the Inequality Quasi-Orderings
Table 3.1 suggests that our inequality quasi-orderings might be nested as the rankings ob-
tained are more or less ¯ner depending on the chosen quasi-ordering. Leaving aside the case
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n = 2, where the preceeding quasi-orderings provide the same ranking of distributions, we
have:
Remark 3.1. Let n > 2 and suppose all the distributions under comparison have equal
means. Then, we have: (i) ¸AD ½ ¸ADP; (ii) ¸AD ½ ¸ASF; (iii) ¸ADP ½ ¸L; (iv) ¸ASF
½ ¸L; and (v) ¸ADP 6= ¸ASF.
Proof: Suppose that x ¸AD y, so that
(3.15) xk+1 ¡ xk · yk+1 ¡ yk; 8 k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1:
Summing the inequalities above over h for h = 1;2;:::;k ¡ 1 and k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1, we
obtain:
(3.16) xk ¡ xh · yk ¡ yh; 8 h = 1;2;:::;k ¡ 1; 8 k = 2;3;:::;n:
(i) ¸AD µ ¸ADP. Suppose that x ¸AD y, so that (3.16) holds. Summing the inequalities in
(3.16) over j for j = h + 1;h + 2;:::;n ¡ 1 and h = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1, and upon simplifying, we
obtain (3.11) so that x ¸ADP y.
(ii) ¸AD µ ¸ASF. Suppose that x ¸AD y, so that (3.16) holds. Summing the inequalities
in (3.16) over i for i = 1;2;:::;k ¡ 1 and k = 2;3;:::;n, and upon simplifying, we obtain
(3.14) so that x ¸ASF y.
(iii) ¸ADP µ ¸L. Developing (3.11), we obtain
(3.17) (n ¡ k + 1)xk ¡ [xk + xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn] ¸ (n ¡ k + 1)yk ¡ [yk + yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn];
for all k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1. The proof then proceeds in (n ¡ 1) successive steps.
Step 1: h = 1. Then (3.17) reduces to
(3.18) nx1 ¡ [x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn] ¸ ny1 ¡ [y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn]:
Since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we deduce from (3.18) that x1 ¸ y1.
Step 2: h = 2. Then (3.17) reduces to
(3.19) (n ¡ 1)x2 ¡ [x2 + x3 + ¢¢¢ + xn] ¸ (n ¡ 1)y2 ¡ [y2 + y3 + ¢¢¢ + yn]:
Adding x1¡x1 and y1¡y1 to the lhs and the rhs respectively of (3.19) and since by assumption
¹(x) = ¹(y), we obtain
(3.20) x1 + (n ¡ 1)x2 ¸ y1 + (n ¡ 1)y2:
Adding (n ¡ 2)x1 ¸ (n ¡ 2)y1, which follows from Step 1, to inequality (3.20), we get ¯nally
(3.21) (n ¡ 1)[x1 + x2] ¸ (n ¡ 1)[y1 + y2];
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hence x1 + x2 ¸ y1 + y2.
. . .
Step h: h = k. Then (3.17) reduces to
(3.22) (n ¡ k + 1)xk ¡ [xk + xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn] ¸ (n ¡ k + 1)yk ¡ [yk + yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn]:
Adding [x1 + ¢¢¢ + xh¡1] ¡ [x1 + ¢¢¢ + xh¡1] and [y1 + ¢¢¢ + yh¡1] ¡ [y1 + ¢¢¢ + yh¡1] to the
lhs and the rhs respectively of (3.22) and since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we obtain
(3.23) x1 + ¢¢¢ + xk¡1 + (n ¡ k + 1)xk ¸ y1 + ¢¢¢ + yk¡1 + (n ¡ k + 1)yk:
Adding (n ¡ k)[x1 + ¢¢¢ + xk¡1] ¸ (n ¡ k)[y1 + ¢¢¢ + yk¡1], which follows from Step k ¡ 1,
to inequality (3.23), we get ¯nally
(3.24) (n ¡ k)[x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡k+1] ¸ (n ¡ k)[y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡k+1];
hence x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡k+1 ¸ y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡k+1.
. . .
Step n ¡ 1: h = n ¡ 1. Then (3.17) reduces to
(3.25) 2xn¡1 ¡ [xn¡1 + xn] ¸ 2yn¡1 ¡ [yn¡1 + yn]:
Adding [x1 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡2] ¡ [x1 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡2] and [y1 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡2] ¡ [y1 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡2] to the
lhs and the rhs respectively of (3.25) and since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we obtain
(3.26) x1 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡2 + 2xn¡1 ¸ y1 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡2 + 2yn¡1:
Adding [x1 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡2] ¸ [y1 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡2], which follows from Step n ¡ 2, to inequality
(3.26), we get ¯nally
(3.27) 2[x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡1] ¸ 2[y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡1];
hence x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡1 ¸ y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡1.
We have shown that x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xk ¸ y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yk, for all k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1. Since
by assumption x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn = y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn, we conclude that x ¸L y.
(iv) ¸ASF µ ¸L. Developing (3.14), we obtain
(3.28) kxk ¡ [x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xk] · kyk ¡ [y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yk];
for all k = 2;3;:::;n. The proof then proceeds in (n ¡ 1) successive steps.
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Step 1: h = n. Then (3.28) reduces to
(3.29) nxn ¡ [x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn] · nyn ¡ [y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn]:
Since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we deduce from (3.29) that xn · yn.
Step 2: h = n ¡ 1. Then (3.28) reduces to
(3.30) (n ¡ 1)xn¡1 ¡ [x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn¡1] · (n ¡ 1)yn¡1 ¡ [y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn¡1]:
Adding xn ¡ xn and yn ¡ yn to the lhs and the rhs respectively of (3.30) and since by
assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we obtain
(3.31) xn + (n ¡ 1)xn¡1 · yn + (n ¡ 1)yn¡1:
Adding (n¡2)xn · (n¡2)yn, which follows from Step 1, to inequality (3.31) we get ¯nally
(3.32) (n ¡ 1)[xn¡1 + xn] · (n ¡ 1)[yn¡1 + yn];
hence xn¡1 + xn · yn¡1 + yn.
. . .
Step n ¡ k + 1: h = k. Then (3.28) reduces to
(3.33) kxk ¡ [x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xk] · kyk ¡ [y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yk]:
Adding [xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn] ¡ [xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn] and [yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn] ¡ [yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn] to the
lhs and the rhs respectively of (3.33) and since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we obtain
(3.34) kxk + [xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn] · kyk + [yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn]:
Adding (k¡1)[xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn] · (k¡1)[yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn], which follows from Step n¡k+2,
to inequality (3.34), we get ¯nally
(3.35) k[xk + xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn] · k[yk + yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn];
hence xk + xk+1 + ¢¢¢ + xn · yk + yk+1 + ¢¢¢ + yn.
. . .
Step n ¡ 2: k = 2. Then (3.28) reduces to
(3.36) 2x2 ¡ [x1 + x2] · 2y2 ¡ [y1 + y2]:
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Adding [x3 + ¢¢¢ + xn] ¡ [x3 + ¢¢¢ + xn] and [y3 + ¢¢¢ + yn] ¡ [y3 + ¢¢¢ + yn] to the lhs and
the rhs respectively of (3.36) and since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we obtain
(3.37) 2x2 + [x3 + ¢¢¢ + xn] · 2y2 + [y3 + ¢¢¢ + yn]:
Adding [x3 + ¢¢¢ + xn] · [y3 + ¢¢¢ + yn], which follows from Step n ¡ 2, to inequality (3.37)
and since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we obtain ¯nally
(3.38) 2[x2 + x3 + ¢¢¢ + xn] · 2[y2 + y3 + ¢¢¢ + yn];
hence x2 + x3 + ¢¢¢ + xn · y2 + y3 + ¢¢¢ + yn.
We have shown that xk +xk+1 +¢¢¢+xn · yk +yk+1 +¢¢¢+yn, for all k = 2;3;:::;n. Since
by assumption x1 + x2 + ¢¢¢ + xn = y1 + y2 + ¢¢¢ + yn, we conclude that x ¸L y.
(v) ¸ADP 6= ¸ASF. Consider the following table where we have made use of the distributions
de¯ned in Example 3.1. By convention the symbol \1" at intersection of line \fxi;xjg" and
row \¸J" indicates that \xi >J xj", while a \#" means that xi and xj are not comparable,
where J 2 fAD;ADP;ASF;Lg. Inspection of Table 3.2 reveals that ¸ADP and ¸ASF are
logically independent.
Table 3.2.
Pairs of Distributions ¸AD ¸ADP ¸ASF ¸L
fx5;x1g 1 1
fx2;x1g # 1 #
fx5;x2g # # 1
fx3;x1g # # 1
fx4;x1g # 1
Finally to make the proof complete, it remains to prove that the inclusions in statements (i)
to (iv) are strict, which follows from Table 3.2. t u
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the three quasi-orderings we have considered so
far are at variance with the Lorenz criterion and thus capture dimensions of inequality that
are not embedded in the latter criterion. A second issue is to determine the structure of
the individuals' preferences towards more equality which support the views expressed by the
di®erentials, satisfaction and deprivation quasi-orderings and inconsistent with those captured
by the Lorenz quasi-ordering. Both issues are of particular importance for understanding the
normative content of these three quasi-orderings and they will be the subject of the two
following sections.
4. Inequality, Solidarity and Equalizing Transformations
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4.1. A Preliminary Result
Although it is typically assumed that inequality is reduced and welfare increased by a progres-
sive transfer, Example 3.1 points at good reasons for challenging this common view. On the
one hand, depending on the way we measure inequality, the e®ect of a transfer of income from
a richer to a poorer individual may be ambiguous. In particular anyone who subscribes to the
views captured by the di®erentials quasi-ordering may feel unable to accept the common view
that inequality unambiguously decreases as a result of a progressive transfer. On the other
hand, one might even consider that inequality has increased as the result of an elementary
progressive transfer. It must be stressed that x ¸L y and y >AD x cannot hold simultane-
ously. This follows from Remark 3.1 according to which, for all x;y 2 Y(D), one has that
x >AD y implies x >L y. However this does not preclude the possibility that I(x) > I(y)
for some inequality index I 2 I consistent with the absolute di®erentials quasi-ordering. This
is because for x >AD y it is necessary that all inequality indices in a given class { to be
determined { declare distribution x as being less unequal than distribution y [see Section
5]. Since these three quasi-orderings are all subrelations of the Lorenz quasi-ordering, it is
clear that, if a distribution is ranked above another one according to either of the former
quasi-orderings, then a sequence of progressive transfers will be needed in order to construct
the dominating distribution starting from the dominated one. However the precise way these
progressive transfers have to be combined for such domination to hold has to be determined.
It might be helpful to begin with a benchmark result that constitutes a ¯rst step to-
wards a more general solution. By construction distributions x2, x3, x4 and x5 in Example
3.1 obtain from x1 by means of a single rank-preserving progressive transfer of one income
unit. Close inspection reveals that the only case where the resulting distribution dominates
the original distribution according to the di®erentials quasi-ordering is when the progressive
transfer involves the richest and the poorest individual. The three cases where the progres-
sive transfers generate an improvement according to the deprivation quasi-ordering is when
income is taken from the richest individual and given to someone poorer. Finally a transfer
from any richer individual to the poorest one results in a reduction of inequality as measured
by the satisfaction quasi-ordering. The positions on the income scale of the individuals taking
part in the transfer seem to play a crucial role in the redistributive impact of the progressive
transfer. The result below { which we state without proof { indicates the restrictions one has
to introduce for inequality to decrease as a result of a single progressive transfer in a very
particular case.
Remark 4.1. Let n > 2 and x;y 2 Yn(D) such that, such that y1 < y2 · ::: · yn¡1 < yn.
Suppose we are only permitted to use a single rank-preserving progressive transfer in order
to obtain x from y. Then, we have:
(a) x ¸AD y if and only if 1 = i < j = n.
(b) x ¸ADP y if and only if i < j = n.
(c) x ¸ASF y if and only if 1 = i < j.
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(d) x ¸L y if and only if i < j.
This result uncovers the rationale behind the construction of Example 3.1 and also hints at
potential explanations why the public might reject the principle of transfers in some given
situations. But above all Remark 4.1 con¯rms that there is little room for reducing inequality
as measured by either of the di®erentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings if one
is only allowed to make use of elementary progressive transfers.
4.2. General Results
Given Remark 4.1 we know that, for inequality as measured by any of the di®erentials, depri-
vation and satisfaction quasi-orderings to decrease, a single progressive transfer will generally
not be su±cient and progressive transfers will have to be combined in one way or another.
Therefore our ¯rst task is to identify possible transformations of distributions which combine
progressive transfers in such a way that domination in terms of the di®erentials, deprivation
and satisfaction quasi-orderings obtains. A related task is to derive the appropriate sequence
of such transformations that permits to obtain the dominating distribution from the domi-
nated one. We impose to ourselves two requirements: (i) the transformations must admit as a
particular case the progressive transfers exhibited in Remark 4.1, and (ii) the transformations
must be elementary in the sense that they are as simple as possible. The latter requirement
has the e®ect that in general a single transformation would not su±ce to convert the domi-
nated distribution into the dominating one: successive applications of such transformations
will be needed.
Considering ¯rst those transformations, which successive applications of result in a distri-
butional improvement according to the di®erentials quasi-ordering, we propose:
Definition 4.1. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a T1-transformation, if there exists ±;² > 0 and two individuals h;k
(1 · h < k · n) such that condition (3.2) holds and:
xg = yg; 8 g 2 fh + 1;:::;k ¡ 1g; (4.1.a)
xi = yi + ±; 8 i 2 f1;:::;hg; xj = yj ¡ ²; 8 j 2 fk;:::;ng; (4.1.b)
h± = (n ¡ k + 1)²: (4.1.c)
Therefore T1-transformations comprise as a particular case the progressive transfers identi¯ed
in statement (a) of Remark 4.1. Such elementary transformation impose a lot of solidarity in
the society. There is solidarity among the rich: if some income is taken from a rich individual,
then the same amount has to be taken from every richer individual. Symmetrically, there
is solidarity among the poor: if some income is given to a poor individual, then the same
amount has to be given to every poorer individual. This solidarity among the donors and the
beni¯ciaries is typically broken down in the progressive transfer. The following result identi¯es
the relationship between the absolute di®erentials quasi-ordering and T1-transformations.
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Proposition 4.1. Let n > 2 and x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y). Then, the following
two statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite sequence of T1-transformations.
(b) x ¸AD y.
The proofs of this result and of the next two propositions are particularly tedious and they
are not given here11.
Turning now attention to those transformations, which successive applications of would
result in a distributional improvement according to the deprivation quasi-ordering, we pro-
pose:
Definition 4.2. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a T2-transformation, if there exists ±;² > 0 and two individuals h;k
(1 · h < k · n) such that condition (3.2) holds and:
xg = yg; 8 g 2 f1;:::;h ¡ 1g [ fh + 1;:::;k ¡ 1g; (4.2.a)
xh = yh + ±; xj = yj ¡ ²; 8 j 2 fk;:::;ng; (4.2.b)
± = (n ¡ k + 1)²: (4.2.c)
Again a progressive transfer constitutes a particular case of a T2-transformation, which
in turn is a particular T1-transformation. Although solidarity is still present in a T2-
transformation, it is now limited to the donors. If some income is taken from a rich individual,
then the same amount is to be taken from every richer individual. However it is no longer
necessary that individuals poorer than the transfer recipient do bene¯t also from some [equal]
additional income. The result below establishes the connection between dominance in terms
of the absolute deprivation quasi-ordering and T2-transformations.
Proposition 4.2. Let n > 2 and x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y). Then, the following
two statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite sequence of T2-transformations.
(b) x ¸ADP y.
Finally we consider the transformations, which successive applications of would result in
a distributional improvement according to the satisfaction quasi-ordering. We propose:
Definition 4.3. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D), we will say that x is obtained
from y by means of a T3-transformation, if there exists ±;² > 0 and two individuals h;k
11We invite the interested reader to consult the longer version of the paper which contains the details of the
proofs [see Chateauneuf and Moyes (2004)].
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(1 · h < k · n) such that condition (3.2) holds and:
xg = yg; 8 g 2 fh + 1;:::;k ¡ 1g [ fk + 1;:::;ng; (4.3.a)
xi = yi + ±; 8 i 2 f1;:::;hg; xk = yk ¡ ²; and (4.3.b)
h± = ²: (4.3.c)
The progressive transfers identi¯ed in statement (c) of Remark 4.1 are particular instances of
a T3-transformation. A T3-transformation is to some extent the dual of a T2-transformation:
solidarity concerns the bene¯ciaries of the transfer. If some additional income is given to a
poor individual, then the same amount has to be given to every poorer individual. But there
is no need that individuals richer than the donor give away some [equal] amount of income.
Dominance in terms of the absolute satisfaction quasi-ordering and T3-transformations are
related as it shown below.
Proposition 4.3. Let n > 2 and x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y). Then, the following
two statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite and non-empty sequence of T3-transformations.
(b) x ¸ASF y.
Propositions 4.1 to 4.3 show that it is possible to associate to the di®erentials, deprivation and
satisfaction quasi-orderings relatively simple transformations, which by successive applica-
tions allow to derive the dominating distribution starting from the dominated one. Although
these transformations comprise as particular cases the usual progressive transfers, they are
in general more complicated. Invoking Remark 3.1 it is clear that any such transformation
can be decomposed into a ¯nite sequence of progressive transfers.
5. Welfare Comparisons for Equal Mean Distributions
5.1. Two Classes of Social Welfare Functions
Basically, two general families of social welfare functions have been studied in the inequality
literature up to now. The ¯rst approach { the expected utility model or the utilitarian
social welfare function { assumes linearity in the weights so that social welfare in situation







where the utility function U is increasing and de¯ned up to an increasing and a±ne trans-





Qi := 1 ¡ Pi¡1 =
n ¡ i + 1
n
; (5.2.b)
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for all i = 1;2;:::;n, with P0 = 0 and Qn+1 := 0. Letting x0 := 0, the second approach {




[f (Qi) ¡ f (Qi+1)]xi ´
n X
i=1
f (Qi)[xi ¡ xi¡1];
where f 2 F := ff : [0;1] ¡! [0;1] jf continuous, non-decreasing;f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1g
is the weighting function. Inequality aversion is fully captured by the utility function U in
the utilitarian framework and by the weighting function f in the Yaari model. The two former
models are actually particular cases of the rank-dependent expected utility model [see e.g.
Quiggin (1993)].
5.2. An Almost Impossibility Result
The egalitarian nature of the utilitarian rule has long been recognized when all individuals
have the same concave utility function. Precisely a progressive transfer improves social welfare
as measured by the utilitarian rule if and only if the common utility function is concave. In
combination with Proposition 3.1 this implies that Lorenz domination holds if and only
if, whatever the concave utility function one chooses, the sum of utilities generated by the
dominating distribution is always greater than the sum of utilities generated by the dominated
distribution. However the equalizing implications of the utilitarian social welfare function are
based on a particular notion of inequality reduction and one may wonder what happens when
alternative inequality views { such as the ones considered in this paper { are substituted
for the ones captured by the Lorenz criterion. Because the quasi-orderings we are interested
in are weaker than the Lorenz quasi-ordering { they imply but are not implied by it { one
expects that the class of utility functions that guarantee that the utilitarian rule is equalizing
is larger than the class of the concave utility functions. Actually the utilitarian model is not
°exible enough to distinguish between the views captured by the di®erentials, deprivation
and satisfaction quasi-orderings. Precisely we have the following result:
Proposition 5.1. Let n > 2 and J 2 fAD;ADP;ASF;Lg. Then, the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
(a) For all x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y): x ¸J y =) WU(x) ¸ WU(y).
(b) U is concave.
Proof: The technique of proof builds on standard arguments used for instance in Ebert and
Moyes (2002, Prop. 4.8). Consider the four following statements:
(a-1) For all x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y): x ¸AD y =) WU(x) ¸ WU(y).
(a-2) For all x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y): x ¸ADP y =) WU(x) ¸ WU(y).
(a-3) For all x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y): x ¸ASF y =) WU(x) ¸ WU(y).
(a-4) For all x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) = ¹(y): x ¸L y =) WU(x) ¸ WU(y).
The proof consists in establishing the four chains of implications: (b) =) (a-4), (a-4) =)
(a-3) =) (a-1), (a-4) =) (a-2) =) (a-1), and (a-1) =) (b).
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(b) =) (a-4). This is a well-known result in the theory of inequality measurement [see e.g.
Marshall and Olkin (1979, B.1)].
(a-4) =) (a-3). We argue a contrario and show that :(a-3) =) :(a-4). Suppose that:
(5.9) 9x;y 2 Yn(D) with ¹(x) = ¹(y) j x ¸ASF y ^ :[WU(x) ¸ WU(y)] :
Since ¸ASF ½ ¸L, this implies that
(5.10) 9x;y 2 Yn(D) with ¹(x) = ¹(y) j x ¸L y ^ :[WU(x) ¸ WU(y)] :
(a-4) =) (a-2). Similar to the proof that (a-4) =) (a-3).
(a-3) =) (a-1). Similar to the proof that (a-4) =) (a-3).
(a-2) =) (a-1). Similar to the proof that (a-4) =) (a-3).
(a-1) =) (b). We argue a contrario and show that :(b) =) :(a-1). Suppose that there






< U(u) + U(v):
Consider next distributions x = ((u + v)=2;(u + v)=2;:::;(u + v)=2;(u + v)=2) and y =
(u;(u + v)=2;:::;(u + v)=2;v). By construction ¹(x) = ¹(y) and
(5.12) x1 ¡ y1 =
v ¡ u
2
> x2 ¡ y2 = 0 = ¢¢¢ = 0 = xn¡1 ¡ yn¡1 > ¡
v ¡ u
2
= xn ¡ yn;
so that x >AD y. Using (5.11), we obtain WU(x)¡WU(y) < 0 and we conclude that condition
(a-1) is violated, which makes the proof complete. t u
The consistency of the utilitarian social welfare function with the di®erent inequality views
captured by our three quasi-orderings leads to the same restriction as the one implied by
Lorenz-consistency: the utility function has to be concave. Thus the utilitarian model does
not permit to distinguish between the views embedded in the Lorenz quasi-ordering and its
three competitors: the di®erentials, the deprivation and the satisfaction quasi-orderings. On
the contrary, as we will demonstrate in a while, an ethical observer endowed with the Yaari
social welfare function will be able to make a di®erence between these alternative views.
5.3. Consistency of the Yaari Model with Di®erent Inequality Views
Before we state our main results, we need ¯rst introduce some de¯nitions concerning the
weighting function. Given a function g : R ¡! R and an interval V µ R, we will say that g
is convex over V if
(5.13) 8 u;v 2 V;8 ¸ 2 [0;1] : g((1 ¡ ¸)u + ¸v) · (1 ¡ ¸)g(u) + ¸g(v):
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Given V := (v;v) µ R and » 2 V , we will say that g is star-shaped from above at » if






[see e.g. Landsberger and Meilijson (1990)]. Each of the four following classes of weighting
functions will play a crucial role in subsequent developments:
FAD := ff 2 F j f(Q) · Q; 8Q 2 (0;1)g; (5.15.a)
FADP := ff 2 F j f is star-shaped from above at 0g; (5.15.b)
FASF := ff 2 F j f is star-shaped from above at 1g; (5.15.c)
FL := ff 2 F j f is convex over [0;1]g: (5.15.d)
It is a straightforward exercise to check that the classes of weighting functions de¯ned above
are nested in the way indicated below.
Remark 5.1. (i) FL ½ FADP ½ FAD; (ii) FL ½ FASF ½ FAD.
Typical members of the classes FAD, FADP, FSFP and FL are represented in Figures 5.1,
5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. One can easily check that the weighting functions represented
in Figure 5.4 are convex and thus star-shaped from above at 0 and 1, and that they also verify
f(Q) · Q, for all Q 2 (0;1). Figure 5.3 depicts weighting functions that are star-shaped from
above at 1, verify f(Q) · Q, for all Q 2 (0;1), but are neither star-shaped from above at
0 nor convex. On the other hand the weighting functions represented in Figure 5.2 depicts
are star-shaped from above at 0 and thus verify f(Q) · Q, for all Q 2 (0;1), but are neither
star-shaped from above at 1 nor convex. Finally the weighting functions depicted in Figure
5.1 are not star-shaped but they lie everywhere below the main diagonal.
We are interested in identifying the restrictions to be placed on the weighting function
f 2 F for the Yaari social welfare function to be consistent with our absolute quasi-orderings.
Actually we are able to provide more general results that establish the links between the
di®erent equalizing transformations we introduced in Section 4, subclasses of the Yaari social
welfare functions and the inequality quasi-orderings.
Considering ¯rst the inequality view captured by the absolute di®erentials quasi-ordering,
we obtain:
Proposition 5.2. Let n > 2 and consider two distributions x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) =
¹(y). Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite sequence of T1-transformations.
(b) Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y), for all f 2 FAD.
(c) x ¸AD y.
Proof: Since we know from Proposition 4.1 that statements (a) and (c) are equivalent, we
only have to show that statements (b) and (c) are equivalent. Letting ¢Wf := Wf(x)¡Wf(y)
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and using the fact that by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we derive from (5.3) that




[f (Qh) ¡ Qh][(xh ¡ xh¡1) ¡ (yh ¡ yh¡1)]:
(c) =) (b): Let that f 2 FAD, which implies that f (Qi) ¡ Qi · 0, for all i = 2;3;:::;n.
Upon substituting in (5.16) and using the fact that by de¯nition f (Q1)¡Q1 = 0, we deduce
that x ¸AD y is su±cient for Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y).
(b) =) (c): Choose Áh(Q) := ®h
1 + ¯h










for h = 2;3;:::;n. Consider then the piecewise linear function fh : [0;1] ¡! [0;1] de¯ned by
(5.18) fh(Q) :=
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
Q; for 0 · Q < Qh+2;
Qh¡1; for Qh+2 · Q < Qh+1;
Áh(Q); for Qh+1 · Q < Qh;
Q; for Qh+1 · Q · Q1;
for h = 2;3;:::;n. Clearly fh 2 FAD, for h = 1;2;:::;n [see Figure 5.1]. Assuming that
condition (b) holds and upon substitution into (5.16), we obtain
(5.19) Wf(x) ¡ Wf(y) = (Qh+1 ¡ Qh)[(xh ¡ xh¡1) ¡ (yh ¡ yh¡1)] ¸ 0;
for all h = 2;3;:::;n. Since by de¯nition Qh+1 ¡Qh < 0, for all h = 2;3;:::;n, we conclude
that xh ¡ xh¡1 · yh ¡ yh¡1, for all h = 2;3;:::;n, hence x ¸AD y. t u
The conditions that ensure inequality reduction in terms of the absolute income di®erentials
are rather weak: the weighting function must lie below the main diagonal in the [0;1]£[0;1]
space. Therefore the class of Yaari social welfare functions that are consistent with the views
expressed by the di®erentials quasi-ordering is quite large.
We turn now to the absolute deprivation quasi-ordering and search for the restrictions to
be placed on the weighting function f that guarantee that the Yaari social welfare function
is consistent with this criterion.
Proposition 5.3. Let n > 2 and consider two distributions x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) =
¹(y). Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite sequence of T2-transformations.
(b) Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y), for all f 2 FADP.
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(c) x ¸ADP y.
Proof: Since we know from Proposition 4.2 that statements (a) and (c) are equivalent, we
only have to show that statements (b) and (c) are equivalent. Letting ¢Wf := Wf(x)¡Wf(y)






























where by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y).
(c) =) (b): Let f 2 FADP which implies that f (Qh+1)/Qh+1 · f (Qh)/Qh, for all h =
1;2;:::;n ¡ 1. Using the fact that by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), it follows from (5.20) that
x ¸ADP y is a su±cient condition for Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y).
(b) =) (c): Choose Ãh(Q) := ®h
2 + ¯h
















0; for 0 · Q < Qh+1;
Ãh(Q); for Qh+1 < Q < Qh;
Q; for Qh · Q · 1;
for h = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1. Clearly fh 2 F2, for h = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1 [see Figure 5.2]. Assuming
that condition (b) holds and upon substitution into (5.20), we obtain


















for h = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1, from which we conclude that x ¸ADP y. t u
The conditions that ensure inequality reduction in terms of the absolute deprivation quasi-
ordering are weaker than convexity: the weighting function must be star-shaped at the origin
on the interval (0;1).
The next result identi¯es the restrictions to be placed on the weighting function f that
guarantee that the Yaari social welfare function is consistent with the absolute satisfaction
quasi-ordering.
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Proposition 5.4. Let n > 2 and consider two distributions x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) =
¹(y). Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite sequence of T3-transformations.
(b) Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y), for all f 2 FASF.
(c) x ¸ASF y.
Proof: Since we know from Proposition 4.3 that statements (a) and (c) are equivalent, we
only have to show that statements (b) and (c) are equivalent. Letting ¢Wf := Wf(x)¡Wf(y)





1 ¡ f (Qh+1)
1 ¡ Qh+1
¡





















1 ¡ f (Qn+1)
1 ¡ Qn+1
[¹(x) ¡ ¹(y)];
where by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y).
(c) =) (b): Let f 2 FASF so that (1¡f (Qh+1))/(1¡Qh+1) · (1¡f (Qh))/(1¡Qh), for
all h = 2;3;:::;n. Then, since by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y), we conclude that x ¸ASF y
guarantees that condition (5.24) holds, hence Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y).
(b) =) (c): Choose 'h(Q) := ®h
3 + ¯h
















Q; for Q · Q < Qh+1;
Qh+1; for Qh+1 · Q < Qh;
'h(Q); for Qh · Q · 1;
for h = 2;3;:::;n. Clearly fh 2 F3, for h = 2;3;:::;n [see Figure 5.3]. Assuming that
condition (b) holds and upon substitution into (5.26), we obtain























for h = 2;3;:::;n. Since by de¯nition Qh+1 < Qh, for all h = 1;2;:::;n, we deduce from
(5.27) that x ¸ASF y. t u
The conditions that ensure inequality reduction in terms of the absolute satisfaction quasi-
ordering are weaker than convexity: the weighting function must be star-shaped at 1 over
(0;1).
Finally for the sake of completeness we recall the conditions to be met by the weighting
function for the Yaari social welfare function to be consistent with the Lorenz quasi-ordering.
25Alain Chateauneuf and Patrick Moyes
Proposition 5.5. Let n > 2 and consider two distributions x;y 2 Yn(D) such that ¹(x) =
¹(y). Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) x is obtained from y by means of a ¯nite sequence of single progressive transfers.
(b) Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y), for all f 2 FL.
(c) x ¸L y.
Proof: Since it is well-known that statements (a) and (c) are equivalent [see Proposition
3.1], it su±ces to check that statements (b) and (c) are equivalent. Letting ¢Wf := Wf(x)¡

























where by assumption ¹(x) = ¹(y).
(c) =) (b): Suppose that f 2 FL i.e., f is convex in Q over [0;1], which implies that
(5.29)
f (Q1) ¡ f (Q2)
Q1 ¡ Q2
·
f (Q3) ¡ f (Q4)
Q3 ¡ Q4
;
for all Q1;Q2;Q3;Q4 2 [0;1] such that Q4 < Q3 · Q1 and Q4 · Q2 < Q1 [see e.g. Marshall
and Olkin (1979, 16.B.3.a)]. Then x ¸L y guarantees that condition (5.29) holds, hence
Wf(x) ¸ Wf(y).
(b) =) (c): Let Âh(Q) := ®h
4 + ¯h














0; for 0 · Q < Qh+1;
Âh(Q); for Qh+1 · Q · 1;
for h = 2;3;:::;n. Clearly fh 2 F4, for h = 2;3;:::;n [see Figure 5.4]. Assuming that
condition (b) holds and upon substitution into (5.31), we obtain












for h = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1, from which we conclude that x ¸L y. t u
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The convexity of the weighting function is therefore necessary and su±cient for welfare as
measured by the Yaari social welfare function to increase as the Lorenz curve moves upwards.
Contrary to the utilitarian model, which does not allow to make a distinction between the
inequality views considered in this paper, the Yaari social welfare function permits to sepa-
rate these di®erent attitudes towards inequality. This is achieved by means of the weighting
function which captures the planner's concern for inequality. Under the equal mean condi-
tion, Propositions 5.2 to 5.5 identify the restrictions to be placed on the weighting function
that guarantee that welfare does not decrease when inequality as measured by our four quasi-
orderings goes down. The propositions also identify the appropriate sequences of transfor-
mations that are needed in order to convert the dominated distribution into the dominating
one for the di®erentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings. These transformations
are more complicated than { and are generally distinct from { the traditional progressive
transfers.
6. Extensions When Distributions Have Different Means
So far we have restricted our attention to the comparison of distributions with equal means,
in which case the notions of inequality and welfare are related in a one-to-one way. Here we
turn to the more general case where the distributions under comparison do not necessarily
have the same mean. Then the relationship between inequality and welfare is no longer
unambiguous and we will focus here on inequality.
Following the ethical approach to inequality measurement, we restrict attention to those
inequality indices that can be constructed from certain particular social welfare functions [see
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (1999)]. Given the social welfare function W : Yn(D) ¡!
R, we let ¥ represent the social evaluation function implicitly de¯ned by
(6.1) W
¡









; 8 x 2 Yn(D);
where ¥(x) is the equally distributed equivalent income corresponding to distribution x. Solv-
ing (6.1) when W is the utilitarian social welfare function, we have








; 8 x 2 Yn(D);




[f (Qi) ¡ f (Qi+1)]xi; 8 x 2 Yn(D):
The absolute inequality index, which measures the average income loss due to inequality, is
de¯ned by
(6.4) IA
U(x) := ¹(x) ¡ ¥U(x); 8 x 2 Yn(D);
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in the case of the utilitarian social welfare function, and by
(6.5) IA
f (x) := ¹(x) ¡ ¥f(x); 8 x 2 Yn(D);
in the case of the Yaari social welfare function, respectively. We denote as ~ x := (~ x1;:::; ~ xn)
the mean-reduced distribution of x 2 Yn(D) obtained by letting ~ xi := xi ¡ ¹(x), for all
i = 1;2;:::;n. The absolute Lorenz curve of distribution x 2 Yn(D) { denoted as AL(p;x)
{ is de¯ned by






ds; 8p 2 [0;1]:
Actually ¡AL(p;x) represents the average income shortfall of the fraction p of the poorest
individuals in situation x [see Moyes (1987)]. Given two income distributions x;y 2 Yn(D),
we will say that x absolute Lorenz dominates y, which we write x ¸AL y, if and only if




[xj ¡ ¹(x)] ¸
k X
j=1
[yj ¡ ¹(y)]; 8k = 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1:
The absolute di®erentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasi-orderings as well as the absolute
Lorenz quasi-ordering have all the property that equal additions to incomes leave inequality
unchanged. More precisely, they satisfy:
Translation Invariance. The binary relation ¸J on Yn(D) is translation-invariant if, for
all x;y 2 Yn(D) and all °;» 2 R:
(6.8) x »J y =) (x + °1n) »J (y + »1n):
We would like to know whether it is possible to ¯nd ethical inequality indices that are con-
sistent with the views re°ected by the absolute di®erentials, deprivation, satisfaction and
Lorenz quasi-orderings.
As far as inequality measurement is concerned, we would like to know if de¯nitions (6.4)
and (6.5) introduce enough °exibility in order to distinguish between the views expressed by
our di®erent quasi-orderings. Actually substituting the [absolute] inequality index for the
social welfare function in the utilitarian framework does not change anything. Before we
present the formal results, we ¯nd it convenient to introduce some technicalities.
Remark 6.1. Let n ¸ 2. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) For all x;y 2 Yn(D): x ¸L y =) IU(x) · IU(y).
(b) U is concave.
Remark 6.1 essentially says that the inequality index IU is Lorenz consistent if and only if
the utility function U is concave. The next result is the crucial step here and it goes back to
Kolm's (1976) plea for the absolute inequality view.
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Remark 6.2. Let n ¸ 2. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) For all x 2 Yn(D) and all ° 2 R: IU (x + °1n) = IU(x) 12.
(b) U(y) = 1
´ exp(´y) for some ´ 2 R and all y 2 D.
This result basically says that inequality is not a®ected by adding or substracting the same
amount to all incomes if and only if the utility function U is of the CARA type and it
is proved in its most general version in Ebert (1988, Theorem 4). The family of utility
functions exhibited in statement (b) of Remark 6.2 is closely associated with what is known
as the Kolm-Pollak family of inequality indices [see Kolm (1976)] We are now in a position
to state the analogue to Proposition 4.1 for the measurement of inequality:
Proposition 6.1. Let n > 2 and J 2 fAD;ADP;ASF;ALg. Then, the following two
statements are equivalent:
(a) For all x;y 2 Yn(D): x ¸J y =) IU(x) · IU(y).
(b) Either U(y) = 1
´ exp(´y) for some ´ < 0, or U(y) = y, for all y 2 D.
We omit the proof of this result which is established by means of arguments similar to those
used in the proof of Proposition 4.1. Proposition 6.1 con¯rms in the case of situations with
possibly di®ering mean incomes what we learnt from Proposition 4.1: the utilitarian model
does not allow one to distinguish between the views associated with the di®erentials, the
deprivation, the satisfaction and the Lorenz [absolute] quasi-orderings.
In contrast the inequality indices derived from the Yaari social welfare function allow us to
separate these di®erent views, and one obtains the same restrictions on the weighting function
as those pointed out in Propositions 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. Precisely, letting FAL = FL, we
obtain:
Proposition 6.2. Let n > 2 and J 2 fAD;ADP;ASF;ALg. Then, the following two
statements are equivalent:
(a) For all x;y 2 Yn(D): x ¸J y =) If(x) · If(y).
(b) f 2 FJ.
7. Concluding Remarks
We have argued in the paper that the utilitarian model, that frames most of the theory of wel-
fare and inequality measurement, is inappropriate when one is interested in inequality views
that are more in accordance with the society's values than the one expressed by the Lorenz
quasi-ordering. Considering three such concepts of inequality { captured by the di®erentials,
the deprivation and the satisfaction quasi-orderings respectively { we have shown that the
Yaari model allows to distinguish between these views. We have furthermore identi¯ed the
classes of Yaari social welfare functions consistent with these three views. These appear to
12In other words this means that the inequality index IU is translatable of degre zero over Yn(D).
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be subclasses of the general class of Lorenz consistent Yaari social welfare functions. It is
expected that some of the views represented by these new criteria are more in line with the
public's perception of inequality. The extent to which these criteria are closer to the public's
view is a matter of empirical investigation which lies outside the scope of this paper. It is
possible to consider other [absolute] inequality views { equivalently quasi-orderings { and in-
vestigate their implications for the properties of the social welfare function. We would rather
point at three other directions which the present analysis could be extended in.
Given the predominance of the relative approach in the literature it would be interesting to
see if it were possible to ¯nd analogous results when one considers the relative versions of the
criteria examined in the paper. The relative versions of the quasi-orderings examined in this
paper can easily be derived. However, up to now we have not been able to identify the restric-
tions to be imposed on the weighting function which guarantee that social welfare increases as
the result of more equally distributed incomes in this case [see however Chateauneuf (1996)].
The rank-dependent expected utility model introduced by Quiggin (1993), which comprises as
particular cases the two approaches examined in this paper, might be helpful in this respect.
Indeed it o®ers more °exibility as the chosen value judgements can be re°ected by, either the
utility function, or the weighting function. Finally the next step to go is surely to charac-
terize by means of additional conditions particular elements of the di®erent classes we have
identi¯ed. Indeed one may raise doubts about the ability of the di®erentials quasi-ordering {
and to a less extent the deprivation and satisfaction quasi-ordering { to generate conclusive
verdicts in practice. Although it must be stressed that these criteria provide guidance in
some cases such as taxation design [see e.g. Chakravarty and Moyes (2003)], it is equally true
that their ability to rank arbitrary real-world distributions is limited. They must therefore
be considered a ¯rst round approach, which should be supplemented by the use of particular
indices in the general classes we have identi¯ed.
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